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Planning the Green State on a Sinking Ship:  
Sea Level Rise Politics in the Maldives 
 
  
 According to the most recent IPCC Report (AR4), global mean sea level is 
projected to rise approximately 60 centimeters over the next century (IPCC, 2007).  This 
projection does not take into account the predicted rapid destabilization of the two largest 
ice sheets in the world: Greenland and Antarctica (Dasgupta, 2009).  The destabilization 
of any significant portion of either the Greenland ice sheet or the West Antarctic ice sheet 
will raise sea level much more than 60 centimeters, endangering many low-lying areas 
(IPCC, 2007).  One of these low-lying areas is the Republic of Maldives.  Standing less 
than 2 meters above sea level on average and with 65% of its land area less than 1 meter 
above sea level, the Maldives is considered the most vulnerable of any populated atoll 
state to sea level rise (Taylor, 2003; Barnett & Adger, 2003).  The potential negative 
impacts of climate change in the Maldives are compounded by its high population density 
as well as its high coastline to land area ratio and its position as a poor, developing and 
peripheral state.  While these might prove as handcuffs to development for some nations, 
they have not stopped the Maldives from becoming a world leader on the issue of climate 
change. 
 While it is one of the most vulnerable of small island developing states (SIDS) to 
sea level rise, the Maldives is also one of the most outspoken countries on the issue. In 
2008, President Mohamed Nasheed was brought to office as a result of the country’s first 
democratic elections. From his very first day in office, as I document below, climate 
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change and sea level rise were a priority for him. Indeed, President Nasheed and his 
cabinet have become climate change celebrities – domestically, but more so 
internationally – as a result of their attention to climate change.  Nasheed has raised the 
profile of the Maldives internationally with statements such as “we will have to buy a 
new homeland”, and “we will be environmental refugees”.  Perhaps most notably, the 
Maldives held an underwater cabinet meeting in October 2009 symbolizing the potential 
for the Maldives to disappear due to predicted future sea level rise.  President Nasheed 
ordered his cabinet to become SCUBA certified to hold this underwater cabinet meeting 
at which the members signed the 350.org accord, a symbolic accord petitioning the world 
to limit atmospheric CO2 concentrations to 350 parts per million at the upcoming climate 
summit in Copenhagen.  The post-meeting press conference was held with the cabinet 
members still afloat in the lagoon (BBC, 2009).    
Is this political theatre? Certainly, Nasheed has a firm grasp on brand 
management, but the underwater signing ceremony was not merely about image in any 
easy sense. My argument below is that this event – and others – are part of a major 
challenge to the status quo global alignments on the topic of climate change. Indeed, my 
argument is that the underwater signing event is part of the Maldives’ much more general 
effort to differentiate themselves from the rest of the global South to save their country 
and harness the potential in emissions cuts.  The key issue here is carbon neutrality. In 
March 2009, Nasheed announced that the Maldives would become the world’s first 
carbon neutral nation by 2019.  It is this willingness to assume a leadership role that 
differentiates the Maldives from other developing states such as those belonging to the 
Group of 77 (G77), a coalition of developing states within the United Nations.  The 
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classic position of the G77 at international climate negotiations is that states have a 
common but differentiated responsibility for global climate change (UNFCCC, 3.1).  
Essentially, the G77 countries argue that they will not cut emissions unless industrialized 
nations make even greater cuts and provide adaptation funding to vulnerable countries.  
The Maldives has transcended this argument, divorced themselves from the G77, and 
globally identified themselves as a potential “showcase” state for green technology.  The 
Maldives recognizes the differentiated risks and responsibilities associated with climate 
change, but rather than waiting for the logjam of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process to unravel, they have made a carbon 
neutral commitment, which in the view of many high-ranking government officials gives 
the Maldives a “moral authority” on this issue.  This is the larger context for Nasheed’s 
widely reported underwater signing event. 
 Through evidence from interviews, I will show how the Maldives has created an 
effective brand for themselves as a green state. I argue that the Maldives novel plan for 
carbon neutrality, rather than having a substantive impact on global CO2 concentrations, 
plays a much more important role in terms of the way it generates authority for the 
otherwise peripheral small island state.  In order to make this argument I first clarify 
relevant secondary literature relating to politics, environmental security, and ecological 
debt amongst others.  Second, I explore the natural science literature concerning sea level 
rise in order to accurately understand the on-the-ground implications of the IPCC report 
for the Maldives.  Third, I present interview data gathered from fieldwork I performed in 
the Maldives during Spring of 2010.  I start, however, with a brief note on how I came to 
the project and methods. 
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Methods 
In Spring 2009, I took an advanced geopolitics seminar with Dr. Coleman and 
became interested in environmental geopolitics, i.e. the links between environmental 
change and state conflict. My specific interest was in various states’ litigation strategies 
as concerns the effects of climate change. In Summer 2009, I started background research 
on a range of states’ involvement in climate change-related litigation.  I started by 
reviewing news articles and court briefs, and came upon the case of Tuvalu, a small 
island state in the Pacific threatening to sue Australia for its carbon emissions.  After 
reading more about Tuvalu and vulnerable island states in general, I came across an 
article by Barnett & Adger, “Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries”.  In this article, the 
authors identify the Republic of Maldives as the most vulnerable of any inhabited atoll 
country according to a vulnerability index measure (Barnett & Adger, 2003).   
Because the Maldives topped Barnett and Adger’s vulnerability index, I decided 
to focus on the case. I approached Dr. Coleman about writing a grant for travel monies to 
visit the Maldives. I was convinced that the Maldives’ situation had to be studied in situ; 
that a ground level case study based on interviews with government leaders would reveal 
insights about the Maldives’ situation relative to sea level rise that was not available 
through the media. Ultimately we were successful. In November 2009 I was awarded a 
grant from the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences as well as a research 
scholarship from the College of Arts and Sciences. Additional support came in the form 
of a STARS grant in recognition of my research with POLENET during Summer 2009.  
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In Autumn 2009 through Spring 2010, I conducted a broad review of secondary 
literature in the social sciences and natural sciences relating to climate change and SIDS.  
In the social sciences, I reviewed literature in environmental security, climate justice, 
climate vulnerability, international climate negotiations, international relations and 
ecological debt.  The natural science portion of my literature review concerned the 
particulars of sea level rise specifically as it pertains to the Maldives. During this period I 
also undertook a detailed genealogy of the Maldives’ published action plans, 
environmental laws, environmental pledges, and strategic motions before major 
international bodies, among other documents.  These documents were mostly available 
on-line. As a result of this research, I produced an outline of government agencies 
involved in the climate change issue as well as a comprehensive list of bureaus and 
offices to approach for interviews. I sent letters to these groups and arranged interviews 
for April-May 2010.  I also compiled a significant list of questions for my potential 
interviewees.  
Because my research involved interaction with human subjects, I submitted an 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) Protocol in February 2010.  This process enabled me to 
think through my research design and prepare precise questions for my interviewees. The 
protocol was reviewed in March 2010 and exempted and approved in March 2010.  All 
materials used in interviews, as well as the general set of interview questions for different 
constituencies were outlined and fully approved by the IRB board.   During the time that 
the IRB was reviewing my research, I read selected literature on interview methodologies 
and techniques.   
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During my research trip, I visited several different offices and interviewed 14 
high-ranking officials in the Maldivian government.  The offices in which I performed 
interviews were: Maldives EPA, Department of Housing, Transport and Environment, 
Office of the President, Office of the Vice President, Ministry of Fisheries, UNDP 
Environment Office, Marine Research Centre.  Generally, these offices were selected 
because of their expertise and experience with issues of climate change in the Maldives.  
As per the IRB, all interview subjects served some function as civil servants or 
government officials.  All interviews were generally tailored to the expertise of the 
individual and their experience with the different sectors of climate change governance.  
Many of the interview subjects are members of the President’s Advisory Council on 
Climate Change, a key advisory body in the Maldivian Government, which is chaired by 
the Vice President and which meets frequently with the President.  The guidelines for 
these interviews were not rigid and most proceeded as an informal conversation about the 
interviewees’ experience with the environmental policies of the Maldives.  The average 
interview lasted approximately 45 minutes to an hour.  I spent approximately 4 weeks, 
mostly in Male’, from April 11 – May 10 performing my research.   
While I arrived with an outline of questions, the more people I talked to, the more 
I realized that the situation was not what I had anticipated.  I originally wanted to 
research how the Maldives had implemented their strategic action plan, specifically its 
incumbent environmental initiatives.  Upon arrival, I realized that the new government 
had not yet begun many of these initiatives covered in the international media. In several 
cases I deemed these programs to be many years from completion.  As a result, I 
narrowed my research to the question of how the Maldives had become a key global 
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player on climate change. My interest was to document the Maldives meteoric rise on the 
question of climate change and sea level rise politics on the global stage from the 
“inside”, so to speak. My goal was ultimately an ethnography of the state via interviews 
rather than a text-based policy analysis.  
Of course, interviews with Maldivian elites are hardly representative of the wider 
political environment in the Maldives. Indeed, while all government officials ascribe to 
the UNFCCC process and the IPCC report, the attitude is not the same for regular 
Maldivians.  For example, in early May, I was on a ferry from Male’ to Rasdhoo, a small 
provincial capital 3 ½ hours away by diesel Dhoni.  Standing on the deck of the boat, I 
was talking to a group of local fishermen and they asked me why I was in the Maldives.  
When I told them that I was doing research on sea level rise they all laughed.  One of 
them told me through a translator, “Sea level is not rising.  You are crazy.”  The men 
went on to explain to me that islands come and go and are always changing shape.  It is 
interactions like these that helped shape later interview questions and complicated my 
understanding of the Maldives as the ‘Green State’.   
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Literature Review 
 
A proper understanding of climate change politics in climate vulnerable states 
must begin at the nexus of several veins of scholarship, namely those of environmental 
security, critical geopolitics, feminist political geography and environmental justice.  
While utilizing these literatures as a starting point, I seek not simply to add to one or all 
of these literatures, but take up questions raised (both explicitly and implicitly) by all.  
Through a synthesis of these four literatures, I hope to establish a previously unexplored 
nexus of seemingly disparate literatures.  Such a starting point will give context to my 
findings as well as establish avenues for further research in many fields.   
 
Environmental Security 
The notion that the environment could be geopolitically relevant emerged in force 
during the 1990s after the end of the Cold War. With conventional “enemies” like the 
Soviet Union gone, practitioners and academics of statecraft began to cast about for new 
sources of geopolitical conflict and insecurity – and the environment emerged at or near 
the top of that list (Dalby, 2002). This is not to discount the important place that things 
environmental have long held in the geopolitics literature, for example in Halford 
Mackinder’s turn-of-last-century division of world space into a strategic “heartland” as 
well as less strategic “outer crescents”. This mostly environmentally determinist 
examination of what world regions could be most powerful has cast a long shadow over 
the geopolitics literature in Geography and Political Science (Kearns, 2009).  However, if 
Mackinder’s legacy during the 20th century was mostly subterranean, it was in the 1990s 
that the environment became a very public and much-scrutinized security concern, in 
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both academia and more popular circles.  Perhaps the most influential of scholars in the 
then emerging classic environmental security school was Thomas Homer-Dixon.  Homer-
Dixon’s research asked if environmental scarcities could be linked in any way to violent 
conflict, and specifically as a cause of the latter. His answer hinged on the problem of 
population growth. On the one hand, population growth could combine with a decrease in 
the quality and/or quantity of renewable resources to produce environmental scarcity. 
Homer-Dixon called this a problem of “resource capture”, in the sense that environmental 
scarcity could lead to elite control over dwindling resources, mass environmental 
disenfranchisement, and eventually state collapse. On the other hand, population growth 
could combine with unequal resource access to produce a decrease in the quality and/or 
quantity of renewable resources and in turn environmental scarcity. Homer-Dixon 
referred to this as “ecological marginalization” and suggested that the main result would 
be mass and uncontrolled migrations from the global south to the global north (Homer-
Dixon, 1994).  
Homer-Dixon found population as the basis for environmental scarcities, and 
while some other scholars have stressed the need to not oversell the linkages between 
violent conflict and global climate change, the focus on population as the main “problem” 
under scrutiny persists (Dabelko, 2008).  This focus on population as the central 
determinant in the issue of scarcity production draws on the antiquated and heavily 
critiqued ideas of 18th century writer Thomas Malthus.  Malthus claimed that resources 
would be outpaced by population growth; Homer-Dixon claims that this creates scarcity, 
which then leads to violent armed conflict (Malthus, 1798; Homer-Dixon, 1994).  One of 
the products of these contemporary population studies, disguised as environmental 
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security studies, is a heavily racialized and Eurocentric understanding of migration as a 
security threat (Dalby, 2009).   
Since the focus of the environmental security literature has been on population 
growth, reproducing the Malthusian ideas of the 1700s, it necessarily picks up the topic 
of migration.  Indeed, specifically, the topic of sea level rise has been implicated as a 
prime mover of millions of members of the global south seeking new livelihoods 
(Raleigh & Urdal, 2008).  Additionally, it is noted that population growth in poor, 
Muslim countries such as the Maldives could cause security and conflict problems at 
North-South intersections as population distortions lead to resource shortages (Goldstone, 
2008).  The living standard in the North is a further pull factor, which could lead to 
increasing resentment in countries experiencing rapid population growth engendering 
further insecurities (Goldstone, 2008).   
The specter of massive population shifts from the poor global South to the 
wealthy global North was forwarded as a potential security issue in the popular 
geopolitical imagination in the mid 1990s in The Atlantic.  The general thesis of these 
works is that the many poor will suffer because of environmental degradation.  A 
combination of this push factor and the pull factor of higher living standards in the West 
will trigger massive migrations from the Global South to the Global North thus rendering 
the wealthy population of the Global North, insecure (Kaplan, 1994; Connolly & 
Kennedy, 1994).  Many of these claims are highly contested.  The literature of 
environmental security is heavily critiqued and I will draw from those critics as well as 
feminist geopolitics to uncover the confluence of these literatures and how they inform a 
study of climate vulnerable states.     
  13 
 
Critical Environmental Security 
A more effective lens through which to understand the situation in climate 
vulnerable states is provided by the critical environmental security literature.  Rejecting 
the relatively unexplained linkages between environmental degradation and armed 
conflict because of a lack of substantial evidence, critical environmental security seeks to 
first critique the methods used by environmental security writers and then expose the 
power discourses that their writing reproduces (Nordas & Gleditsch, 2007).  Stated 
bluntly: “The entire analysis (Homer-Dixon’s) is based on a simple, causal model of 
social friction and violence with few theorized intervening processes” (Peluso & Watts, 
2001, pp. 13). 
 A crucially important theme in any conversation about security is that of peace 
(or a lack thereof).  Classic environmental security has referred to security threats most 
often as threatening a ‘negative peace’ which amounts to little more than the absence of 
violent conflict (Barnett, 2008; Galtung, 1969).  I purport to use the term peace (or a lack 
thereof) in a ‘positive peace’ sense, which can be defined in terms of social justice and 
equality (Barnett, 2007).  This distinction between a negative and a positive peace is 
crucial as discourses of peace and violence permeate the debate on climate change and 
what to do about it (i.e. combating climate change, front line states etc…).  These 
discourses produce geopolitical power particularly in international negotiations.  My 
research further explains how perceived power is produced through climate change 
discourse.  
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For climate vulnerable states, climate change is a very real existential threat.  The 
language used to describe these states is not innocent and is not produced out of a black 
box; rather, it is highly political.  Discourses of violence and vulnerability are crucial to 
understanding how climate change is mobilized in international relations.  Indeed, in 
April 2007, the topic of climate change landed in the most real of security circles: the UN 
Security Council (Nordas & Gleditsch, 2007).  Furthermore, in March, 2008, the UN 
canonized climate change as a human rights issue stating that “climate change poses an 
immediate and far-reaching threat to people and communities around the world and has 
implications for the full enjoyment of human rights” (UNHRC, 2008).  In this paper, I 
explore how climate vulnerable states utilize the discourse of vulnerability to achieve 
greater prominence and authority in the international community.   
The very conception of security must be established before it can be threatened.  
The modern concept of security is a political one, an imagination that renders secure only 
a particular political identity that in turn is contested and produced (Dalby, 1992).  
Additionally, the state is the prime unit of study, a misplaced interest as the security 
provided by states is not always in line with constituents needs (Dalby, 1992).  Indeed, as 
a full critical analysis of authors such as Kaplan, Goldstone and Connolly & Kennedy 
would bear, the object of security is indeed the Global North being made insecure by the 
specter of migration and conflict from the Global South.  A most central critique to this 
literature is asking the question: “Security for Whom?” (Dalby, 1992; Hyndman, 2001).  
Who or what is being made insecure and what or who is doing the insecuring is a crucial 
question that guides my analysis of the Maldives case. 
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Feminist Geopolitics 
While critical geopolitics and critical environmental security provides a useful 
and welcome departure from the neo-Malthusian literature of the mid 1990s, it falls short 
of providing a platform from which to launch an analysis of ‘embodied’ conceptions of 
migration, climate change and security (Hyndman, 2004; Haraway, 1991; Sparke, 2000).  
I take Hyndman’s work seriously as I am attempting to ‘embody’ a previously useful but 
disembodied critical geopolitics.  What Hyndman means by ‘embody’ is to place the 
abstract discussion of geopolitics, which only occurs in academic debates and high 
politics, and ground it in tangible case studies, exploring the human impact and in my 
case the lived-everyday of climate change politics in a vulnerable state.  Additionally, my 
research in the Maldives answers Hyndman’s call to analyze the state as a product 
specifically of those bodies that run it. This means attending to practitioners of statecraft 
– through interviews, for example – rather than approaching the state abstractly through a 
textual analysis of relevant policy documents. Of course, policy documents are important; 
however, they obscure the messiness of statecraft or what feminist political geographers 
call the “lived” aspects of the state, i.e. the state as a chaotic amalgam of everyday 
practices  (Hyndman, 2004).  As such, I am not interested in vague conceptions of the 
state or “its” security. Rather, I attempt to answer the question: “How, then, can dominant 
scripts of geopolitics be both displaced and re-situated in order to foreground the security 
of people on the ground, those subjects effaced by realist geopolitics and international 
relations?” (Hyndman, 2004, pp. 311).  In other words, I am interested in the practice of 
climate change politics specifically as it relates to a small island state operating on the 
classic geopolitical periphery.  I aim to employ this feminist geopolitics to excavate the 
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paths and discourses that key decision makers in the Maldivian state have harnessed to 
achieve one of their stated political goals: “To maneuver the Maldives as a central player 
on climate change globally” (SAP, Maldives Policy Doc, 2008, pp. 392).   
 
Science for Whom? 
While one of the central questions asked by feminist geopolitics of dominant 
geopolitical discourses is “Security for whom?” (Hyndman, 2001).  I seek to apply this 
questioning of discourse briefly to the scientific basis of climate change.  Who or what is 
being served from the science, specifically those summaries from the IPCC?  While I am 
not rejecting empiricism, I endeavor to uncover the manners in which the IPCC, a 
document claiming global salience and relevance, offers predictions regarding global sea 
level when the phenomenon itself is quite spatially heterogeneous.  Furthermore, the 
IPCC report is involved in a process by which local knowledge is disembodied and then 
synthesized and generalized and politicized for a global audience.  Indeed, the most 
influential portion of the IPCC document, the executive summary for policy makers, is 
line item approved by politicians, not scientists (Agrawala, 1998).  To properly 
understand the climate change discourse, one must think critically about the interaction of 
power and knowledge (Pettenger, 2007).   
Additionally, I will execute a review of the scientific literature which states that 
while sea level is projected to rise globally, that rise will not be the same in all places at 
all times.  Furthermore, new literature reveals a counter-intuitive process by which coral 
atolls may actually grow with the rising sea thus not endangering them as much of the 
geopolitical rhetoric would have us believe (Woodroffe, 2007 et. Al.).  Indeed, it is 
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predicted from past data that coral atolls in particular are expected to survive even given 
predicted sea level rise due to the atolls natural adaptive capacity (Kench, McLean & 
Nichol, 2005).  This information provides a unique frame of analysis for climate 
vulnerable states position in the geopolitical imagination as victims, potential migrants or 
refugees, topics I investigate in interviews and other literature.     
 
Of course, coral atolls consisting of sand can only grow by more sand deposition 
from a rising sea level.  Within the case of areas that are concretized (literally covered in 
concrete), such as the entire capital city of Male’, the international airport and other 
islands with harbors, this natural adaptive capacity is no longer available.  Even with 
natural adaptive capacity, the Maldives faces an existential threat.   
 
Environmental Justice  
The concept of environmental security and the question posed it by feminist 
geopolitics arrive at an interesting nexus in the literature of environmental justice.  As 
stated by AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States) in 2009: “We are gravely concerned 
that climate change poses the most serious threat to our survival,” (AOSIS Declaration on 
Climate Change, 2009).  As aforementioned, the issue of climate change as a security and 
human rights issue have been taken up by the UN.  This is crucial as both practotioners of 
statecraft as well as academics have taken up this theory. 
In the debate over climate change, the center of disagreement has moved from the 
scientific basis to assignment of responsibility and projected suffering of its ill effects.  
Within this debate, there are many disparate arguments and factions, which have led to a 
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‘gridlock’ in the arena of international negotiations (Roberts, 2001).  Such gridlock 
should not come as a surprise; indeed no other issue demonstrates the ‘messiness’ of 
global governance like climate change (Liliana et al, 2009).  This gridlock is in part due 
to the difficulty in assigning historical responsibility for emissions (Muller, Hohne and 
Ellermann, 2007).  Also, the costs of mitigating current emissions are perceived as too 
high by many industrialized nations (Adger, 2001).  Many efforts have been made to 
academically unlock the problem of liability for climate change as well as judicially, 
recently evidenced by a decision by a California court to throw out a case by Alaskan 
Intuits attempting to sue a group of energy companies for the loss of their homes1.  When 
discussing liability for climate change, the ‘polluter-pays principle’ almost always is the 
cited precedent for the current problem; however, the debate over CO2 as an 
environmental pollutant is ongoing even in the US Supreme Court2 (Schwarze, 2007; 
Allen, 2003).   
Despite this debate, still swirling amid post-Copenhagen fallout, what has been 
adamantly argued by the SIDS is: “While SIDS are among those that contribute least to 
global climate change and sea level rise, they are among those that would suffer most 
from the adverse effects of such phenomena and could in some cases become 
uninhabitable” (Barbados Declaration, 1994).  Conversely, many industrialized countries 
are not willing to commit to current and future emissions cuts, as this would create 
obvious free-riding incentives for developing countries.  These disparate viewpoints 
make global climate change the consummate long-term policy issue (Hovi et al, 2009).                                                               
1 See case details from the US District Court, Northern District of California, and San 
Francisco Division.  Native Village of Kivalina and City of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. 
etc…This case has since been thrown out of court but others are awaiting trial.   
2 See Massachusetts v EPA, 2007.   
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This dual of risk and responsibility that is risk in the Global South and 
responsibility in the Global North is central to the climate debate today.  Shortly after the 
Kyoto round of negotiations, Gillespie commented on SIDS (Small Island Developing 
States) ability to make an impact on international climate negotiations:  
Currently, the SIDs’ influence appears to be one of being entrapped within the financial 
mechanisms of the regime which are closer to adaptation.  In other words, the battle is 
already lost and the best approach for SIDs is to prepare for the inevitable rather than 
taking the lead at forcing mitigation.  This retreat is regrettable as the climate future is 
open for capture (Gillespie 2003, 67). 
 
Cornelius summarizes aptly both Adger’s book on the subject as well as the state 
of the political argument: “…four main issues: who should take responsibility for climate 
change, how much assistance should be given, how assistance should be distributed, and 
how adaptation decisions should be made at all levels” (Cornelius, 2009 on Adger et. al., 
2006).  These four issues will mold whatever distributive rules and mechanisms arise 
from an effective environmental treaty will be shaped much more by political power than 
any ideal efficiency or effectiveness standards (Krasner, 1991).  This political power is 
generally concentrated with those countries for which the cost of international 
agreements is high leaving countries like SIDS with precious little bargaining power 
(Thompson, 2006).   
The negotiating positions of rich nations in the Global North and poor nations in 
the Global South are determined largely by the ‘triple inequality’ of responsibility, 
vulnerability and mitigation (Roberts and Parks, 2007).  The classic position of the G77 
and other vulnerable and poor nations has been one of vulnerability and non-
responsibility in international climate negotiations.  Scholars have argued for some time 
now that if the climate change discourse is to be altered, it must be by developing nations 
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taking the lead in emissions reductions (Najam, 2003).  The Maldives presents an 
interesting case in that they have recently split from the G77 over this issue precisely.  
Climate change is a deeply political issue the solution for which must be found by a 
fundamentally political process (Paterson, 2003).  Small Island, climate vulnerable states 
have taken it up and made it the political issue for them on the stage of global geopolitics.  
There is a need now more than ever to understand how the balance of political power 
shifts in reaction to climate change.  The implications of this are huge for international 
negotiations as they are a constant power struggle and a prime stage for the shifting 
global geopolitical imagination to be acted out.  How small states with little “hard” power 
are able to appear large in global geopolitics is an anomaly I will explore.   
While the governments of the world seek an agreement on what to do about 
climate change, some of the details, and how they are arrived at, are still under debate.  
Indeed, how the scientific particulars of the IPCC report are arrived at is an intensely 
political process, one crucially important to nations’ geopolitical standing (Agrawala, 
1998).  This is often lost when the debate moves from the realm of natural to social 
science, from the underlying physical and chemical changes in our atmosphere to the 
social costs and political instability brought about by those changes.  I seek to bridge this 
gap in the literature by coupling a review of relevant natural science literature with 
primary research on the everyday operation of a nation state imperiled by climate change.  
The relevant natural science literature includes the most recent IPCC report, various 
articles regarding global eustatic sea level change, reef and atoll geomorphology.  
It is crucially important to understand where the science stands on the issue of 
climate change, specifically sea level rise, as this is the issue on which the Maldives have 
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staked their claim to the world.  Through an examination of the literature, any dissonance 
between the state of the science and the rhetoric of the Maldives will be exposed.  
Understanding how the state performs science and how science is produced by the state 
will aid us in unpacking the geopolitical imagination wrapped up in the topic of 
environmental security.   
 
Sea Level Change 
Global mean sea level is nearly a contradiction in terms.  Since the level of the sea 
is constantly varying over time and space, it is an extraordinary task to measure the 
‘mean’ sea level from which to measure changes in that ‘mean’.  Until the early 1990s, 
mean or eustatic sea level was measured by a series of tide gauges around the world.  
Since 1992 when the TOPEX/Poseidon satellite mission was launched, the most accurate 
sea level change data comes from high-precision satellite altimetry data.  The level of 
precision required was reached by a combination of refinements in data processing and 
instrumentation allowing researchers to make firm conclusions from the satellite data 
(Cazenave & Llovel, 2010).  However, understanding sea level change on a global scale 
is not as simple as measuring the volume of water in a bathtub and changes over time: 
Sea level is a very sensitive index of climate change and variability and, in fact, responds 
to change in several components of the climate system. For example, as oceans respond 
to global warming, seawaters warm and expand, and thus sea level rises. Coupled 
atmosphere-ocean perturbations, like El Nino–Southern Oscillation, affect sea level in a 
rather complex manner. As mountain glaciers melt because of increasing air temperature, 
sea level rises because of freshwater mass input to the oceans. Modification of the land 
hydrological cycle due to climate variability and anthropogenic forcing leads accordingly 
to increased or decreased runoff, and ultimately to sea level change.  Change in the mass 
balance of the ice sheets also has a direct effect on sea level. Even the solid Earth affects 
sea level through ongoing processes of glacial isostatic adjustment (GIA) due to the 
deglaciation event of the last Quaternary ice age. (Cazenave & Llovel, 2010, pp. 146) 
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The most authoritative and influential document in the literature on global climate 
change is the regular IPCC report.  The most recent report published in 2007 states 
explicitly that global mean sea level has been rising and the rate of sea level rise has been 
rising between the 19th and 20th centuries (IPCC, 2007).  This finding is correlated 
explicitly with rising global temperatures and decreased Northern Hemispheric snow 
cover in the Summary for Policymakers (IPCC, 2007).  It is also correlated with global 
average surface temperature {see figure 1}. 
Sea level has historically varied with the formation and decay of major ice sheets, 
sometimes as much as 120 meters from current levels (Church et. al., 2008).  Obviously, 
the formation and decay of major ice sheets is largely but not solely dependent on global 
average temperatures.  Predictions for future sea level rise must rely on paleoclimatic 
data, which indicates that during the last interglacial period, global mean sea level was 
approximately 6 meters higher than present levels (Overpeck et al., 2006).  It is estimated 
that the temperature during the last interglacial period was 2-5°C warmer than at present 
(IPCC, 2007).  The main contributor to sea level rise during this time period was most 
likely meltwater from Greenland and Antarctica (IPCC, 2007).   
This is precisely why the present warming of the climate system is so worrisome 
to countries like the Maldives.  A rise in global average temperature will trigger a rise in 
global average sea level.  The question then becomes how much warming will cause how 
much rise in sea level and where.   
According to the IPCC’s AR4 report, sea level rose at a rate of 1.8±0.5 mm/yr for 
the time period of 1961 – 1993.  During the period from 1993 – 2003, the rate of sea level 
rise increased to 3.1±0.7 mm/yr (IPCC, 2007).  After these findings, the IPCC predicted 
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a rise in sea level over the next century 18 – 59 cm depending upon the climate change 
scenario used (IPCC, 2007).  These estimates do not take into consideration the potential 
and irreversible destabilization and breakdown of the world’s two largest ice sheets, 
Greenland and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (IPCC, 2007).  Because of this among other 
reasons, many scholars have criticized the IPCC report as forwarding too conservative a 
conclusion on the issue of sea level rise (Dasgupta, 2009).  While this may indeed be the 
case, the very nature of the IPCC is conservative particularly in its summary reports 
considering they often “resemble a fox-trot performed by a drunken couple” requiring a 
line by line consensus on all included language (Agrawala, 1998).   
The current sea level rise witnessed in the past half century has two main 
contributing factors: thermal expansion of oceans and melt water runoff from land based 
ice including glaciers and ice sheets (Church et al. 2008; Cazenave & Llovel, 2010).  
Thermal expansion is the main cause sea level rise over the past 50 years (IPCC, 2007).  
These two causes will be the main contributing factors in the future as well {see figure 
2}.  Figure 2 shows the various inputs into the sea level rise equation during two periods.  
The period from 1961-2003 was commonly used as standard sea level data; however, 
since the advent of satellite altimetry, starting in 1993, error margins have decreased and 
all inputs have increased with the observed total sea level rise nearly doubling as a result 
of more precise measurement.   
Thermal expansion is a physical process by which the volume of water expands as 
the temperature rises.  Consequently, as the global average temperature rises, it is to be 
expected that the Earth’s aggregate water volume will increase.  The problem of thermal 
expansion is not this simple, however, because warm water increases in volume more 
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than cold water; additionally, water under higher pressure (at depth) expands more than 
that at low pressure (IPCC, 2007).  Because of these complicating factors, no simple 
correlation between global surface temperature and thermal expansion exists.  A useful 
analogy for thermal expansion of the earth’s oceans on a small scale is something in all of 
our homes.  Today, because of recent EPA regulations, all new water heaters must be 
installed with an expansion tank.  The expansion tank allows the water heater to exhaust 
the excess volume of water into it rather than pushing water back through the pipes and 
into the main.  This same process is occurring but on a truly massive scale.   
The other main contributor to sea level change is the discharge of water into the 
ocean.  This can come from glaciers, ice sheets, reservoirs, lakes, rivers, permafrost and 
the atmosphere.  Discharge from water storage in the atmosphere, reservoirs, lakes, rivers 
and permafrost is negligible when compared to the enormous impact land based ice 
discharge could have on global sea level.    
Of course, understanding sea level rise is only part of the equation as variables 
such as glacial isostatic adjustment and more general solid earth deformation must also 
be taken into account.  For our purposes, we will focus on the solid earth changes 
relevant to this research that is the area of coral atoll geomorphology particularly as it 
relates to sea level rise.   
 
Coral Atoll Geomorphology 
The Maldives are a string of approximately 1200 islands ranging in size from 
several square meters to several square miles grouped into 26 atoll provinces (CIA WFB, 
accessed July, 2010).  These islands are 1.8 m above sea level on average and no point in 
  25 
the Maldives is higher than 3 m above sea level (UNDP, Maldives).  High population 
density, low adaptive capacity and high coastline to land area ratio all contribute to the 
Maldives being the most vulnerable of all small island states (Barnett & Adger, 2003).   
The current operational assumption is that countries like the Maldives will be 
forced to move or take extreme adaptive measures to continue living on their low lying 
islands.  The possibility of complete inundation and thus complete destruction of island 
infrastructure is quite the apocalyptic picture and indeed a possibility.  Common 
knowledge would have the Maldives going under as the sea level rises; however, detailed 
study of the Maldives in particular and coral atoll geomorphology more generally reveals 
a contrary narrative.  In fact, the coral atolls could well keep up with the highest rates of 
sea level rise due to sediment deposition, which occurs with a higher sea level.  Indeed, 
the IPCC report states briefly that, “a few islands are morphologically resilient and are 
expected to persist” (IPCC WGII Executive Summary, 2007, pp.689).  The Maldives is 
one of those few islands.   
Contrary to most established commentaries on the precarious nature of atoll islands, our 
data and model present an optimistic view for the Maldivian islands.  They have existed 
for >5000 yr, are morphologically resilient rather than fragile systems, and are expected 
to persist under current scenarios of future climate change and sea-level rise. (Kench et 
al. 2005, pp. 148) 
 
Indeed, the Maldives may be quite resilient to the shocks of sea level rise over the 
next century if the coral atolls’ natural adaptive capacity can be retained.  Furthermore it 
is believed that the natural ridges on the windward side of most islands will continue to 
grow as sand deposition continues (Woodroffe, 2007).  This is believed to be another 
example of natural resiliency in coral atolls.   
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A study of 27 atoll islands showed a large percentage of islands actually 
increased in size despite rises in sea level and they produced no evidence of significant 
reduction in island size (Kench & Webb, 2010).  If such a finding is accurately applied to 
the Maldives, which consists entirely of atoll reef-islands, it could have profound impacts 
for their geopolitical position.  Of course, the natural adaptive capacity of these atoll 
islands is rendered useless when they become concretized.  Interestingly enough, nearly 
half of the population of the Maldives live in the capital of Male’ which is essentially one 
large concrete slab with absolutely zero natural adaptive capacity.  Furthermore, Male’ 
has been 100% reclaimed3 and cannot expand any further.  In situations like Male’ or the 
airport island, Hulhumale, or nearly every other major island with coastline 
concretization projects (i.e. harbors, docks, sea walls, etc…), the natural adaptive 
capacity and resiliency of the islands is moot as well as the debate about atoll resiliency 
to predicted future sea level rise.   
 
Sea Level Rise in the Maldives 
Sea level change, while commonly conceptualized as a universal phenomenon, 
actually occurs in a spatially heterogenous manner.  Since the early 1990s and the 
beginning of satellite altimetry, full global data exists for sea level changes.  This data 
reveals a large degree of regional variability previously unknown to sea level science.  
Regional variability in sea level change is largely due to variations in thermal expansion, 
the largest contributing factor to recent sea level change (Cazenave & Llovel, 2010;                                                         
3 The process of reclamation involves pumping sand from the ocean floor to the reef 
surrounding an island to expand the buildable, dry surface of the island.  This is done to 
build the island up and out and in the case of Male’, this has been done all the way to the 
edge of the coral reef rendering Male’ 100% reclaimed.   
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Cabanes et al. 2001).  Because of this spatial heterogeneity, in-situ studies are useful to 
provide detailed explanation of local factors contributing to sea level change. 
While in situ tide gauge data from 3 sites in the Maldives reveals a trend similar 
to that found in the satellite altimetry data (Merrifield, personal communication), several 
scholars have offered ‘new perspectives’ on the issue.  Nils-Axel Morner is one such 
author who published an article in 2003 in the Journal of Global and Planetary Change 
entitled “New Perspectives for the future of the Maldives” in which he makes several 
claims: 
In the region of the Maldives, a general fall of sea level occurred some 30 years ago.  The 
origin of this sea level fall is likely to be an increased evaporation over the central Indian 
Ocean linked to an intensification of the NE-monsoon.  Furthermore, there seems no 
longer to be any reasons to condemn the Maldives to become flooded in the near future.  
(Morner 2003, pp. 182).   
 
If what Morner claims is accurate, it totally confounds the Maldives geopolitical 
position vis-à-vis the threat posed by climate change.  Morner and his team performed 
research in the Maldives on general island morphology, gathered anecdotal evidence 
from fishermen about a shallow sailing route and describe the relative elevation of a 
skeleton with respect to sea level rise to build their case.  Their conclusions are that sea 
level dropped by 30 cm sometime in the past 50 years and there is no reason to expect a 
future rise in sea level in the region of the Maldives (Morner et al, 2003).   
Morner is heavily critiqued.  In 2005, Philip Woodworth published an article that 
deconstructs and exposes Morner’s argument.  Woodworth systematically refutes all of 
Morner and his team’s evidence for their claims.  His critique is worth citing at length:  
The suggestions of such a fall (30 cm) has been examined from meteorological and 
oceanographic perspectives and found to be implausible…In particular, a suggestion that 
an increase in evaporation could have caused the fall has been demonstrated to be 
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incorrect.  Without any real evidence for a hitherto-unrecognized process which could 
lead to a sea level change as significant as that proposed by the fieldwork team, one 
concludes that a rise in sea level of approximately half a meter during the 21st century, as 
suggested by the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change Third Assessment Report, 
remains the most reliable scenario to employ in future studies of the islands. 
(Woodworth, 2005, pp. 1).   
 
Morner’s conclusions are established on highly questionable data, some of which 
is merely sparse anecdotal evidence relating to changes in a boating channel.  
Furthermore, he seems to question his own findings in the last sentence of his article, 
“Besides, at about 1000-800 BP, the people of the Maldives survived a higher sea level 
by about 50-60 cm” (Morner et al., 2003, pp. 182).  Ultimately, Morner’s construction of 
a new future for the Maldives falls apart and warrants little credit or further exploration.   
While Morner may have performed faulty research, have questionable funding 
ties to energy-related think tanks and publish highly critiqued articles, he does provide us 
with some interesting if misguided commentary on sea level rise in the Maldives.   
If you go around the globe, you find no rise anywhere.  But they need the rise, because if 
there is no rise, there is no death threat…. So we made a very nice program for Maldives 
television, but it was forbidden by the government!  Because they thought that they 
would lose money.  They accuse the West for putting out carbon dioxide, and therefore 
we have to pay for our damage and the flooding.  So they wanted the flooding scenario to 
go on. (Morner, 2007, pp. 35).   
 
While Morner is wrong about the state of sea level, he touches briefly, if 
accidentally on the subject of perception of danger.  The Maldives has forwarded 
themselves as an at-risk state, a nation of people who potentially will have to move to dry 
land because of a rising sea.  Indeed, with no sea level rise, there is no death threat.  
Without a flooding scenario, there is no underwater cabinet meeting.  As aforementioned, 
atoll geomorphologic evidence reveals a surprising natural adaptive capacity in the 
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Maldives in response to sea level rise.  Indeed, on islands where no concrete exists, where 
the dynamic and natural state of the island remains intact, one can expect those islands to 
rise with the sea.  However, no island exists in this state when inhabited by man.  All 
inhabited islands have been concretized, settlements permanantized and fishing docks 
and harbors built reducing the natural adaptive capacity of the islands.  So while it may 
very well be that hundreds of islands grow up with the rising seas, it is of little more than 
academic importance to those living in the Maldives who’s livelihoods will be threatened 
by sea level rise.  As is clearly evident from a picture of Male’, the dense capital of the 
Maldives, there exists zero natural resiliency on this island.  If the island is going to 
adapt, it will be through human invention {see figure 3}     
 
Death of a nation 
The Maldives is a sovereign nation of approximately 300,000 people spread 
across a chain of nearly 1200 islands in the Indian Ocean (UN Maldives, 2010).  The 
islands range in size from several square meters to several square kilometers, and in the 
aggregate comprise slightly less than 300 square kilometers (CIA WFB, 2010).  They are 
clustered into 20 administrative atolls representing 26 natural atoll formations (Invest 
Maldives, 2010).  Maldivian citizens inhabit 200 islands on a permanent basis, and nearly 
100 additional islands house high-end resorts (Maldives DOI, 2010).  Government policy 
dictates that there be only one resort per island; moreover, no tourist resorts are permitted 
on inhabited islands.  The population distribution in the Maldives is mostly urban. For 
example, a full third of the Maldivian population lives in Male’, which at approximately 
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2 square kilometers is one of the most densely populated places on earth at more than 
50,000 persons per square kilometer (UN Maldives, 2010).    
The highest point of elevation on the coral archipelago is approximately 3 meters 
above sea level (CIA WFB, 2010).  However, the average elevation above sea level for 
the full chain of islands is only 1.6 meters above sea level, with many islands lower lying 
still (Invest Maldives, 2010).  Alongside the fact that none of the islands are very large in 
terms of surface area, this means that all inhabitants live quite close, both in terms of 
distance and elevation, to a coastline.  While this appeals to the some 600,000 tourists 
who arrive every year in the Maldives, it serves as a constant reminder for the Maldives’ 
300,000 inhabitants of their very near existential threat from sea level rise. 
Tourism makes up the largest part of the Maldives GDP, with some estimates of 
both direct and indirect impacts putting it at nearly 70% of the nation’s GDP (UN 
Maldives, 2010).  The second largest component of the economy is fishing.  Both these 
industries are environmentally intensive and can be environmentally damaging.  
Certainly, they both rely heavily on the natural environment of the Maldives for their 
existence.  For example, the incredible diving sites located throughout the Maldives 
motivate most of the tourism in the Maldives.  The Maldives has some of the most 
beautiful coral reefs in the world and they attract hundreds of thousands of visitors a year, 
accounting for the majority of the tourism sector.  While the main prize for the fishing 
industry is tuna, a migratory open water fish, the bait used to catch these fish is gathered 
from the reefs in the form of grouper, red snapper and other reef fish.  Coral reefs are 
directly and indirectly responsible for an enormous majority of the Maldives GDP and 
economic prosperity or lack thereof.    
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The Maldivian people have a fiercely independent spirit having settled in the 
islands as early as 2500 years ago (Invest Maldives, 2010).  During this time, a language 
unique in both script and intonation formed in the Maldives called Dhivehi.  It is only 
spoken in the Maldives.  While the Maldives did become a Sultanate in the 12th century 
AD and remained one until 1968, it retained a large degree of self-governance and rule.  
In 1887, the Maldives became a British protectorate and existed as both protectorate and 
Sultanate until freedom from the United Kingdom in 1965 and the abolition of the 
Sultanate in 1968.  This was accompanied by the arrival of a republic form of 
government.   
The first decade of free rule was tumultuous. Power changed hands frequently 
until in 1978 with the election of President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom.  Gayoom would 
run 6 more times unopposed for president in a system designed to retain him.  The system 
existed as a pseudo-parliamentary one in which the parliament elects an individual to be 
approved by a majority public referendum vote (Ibrahim Rasheed, personal 
communication, 2010).  Gayoom’s rule prompted much growth as he opened the 
Maldives for development, particularly the tourist sector. However, accusations of human 
rights violations, exile of political opponents, and general lack of popular freedoms 
punctuated his rule.  Gayoom’s main opponent through his later terms was Mohamed 
Nasheed, a journalist who Gayoom exiled, imprisoned and had beaten several times. 
In 2008, after public outcries over the need for election reform, Mohamed 
Nasheed was elected president in the nation’s first democratic election in its history.  
Nasheed’s platform focused on combating poverty and institutionalizing good 
governance. Ironically, environmental reform was not part of his election strategy; this 
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despite the fact that the Nasheed government is practically synonymous with climate 
change mitigation policies internationally. Nasheed’s post-election attention to climate 
change – and the associated problem of sea-level rise – is in part a legacy of Gayoom’s 
years in office. For example, Gayoom began speaking to the international community 
about sea level rise after Male’ was nearly completely flooded during a storm in 1987.  
The associated problems of climate change and sea-level rise quickly became an urgent 
issue for Gayoom. In an urgent 1987 speech to the UN General Assembly later dubbed 
the “Death of a Nation” speech, Gayoom outlined the Maldives’ environmental 
vulnerability due to its low elevation and proclaimed the Maldives as a global test site of 
sorts where the world could witness the ravages of environmental change-induced sea-
level rise: “We in the Maldives have seen and lived through grim experiences which 
could be the indicators of the dire consequences of global environmental change 
provoked and aggravated by man” (Gayoom, 1987).  In a subsequent 1990 address to the 
UN General Assembly, which for the first time positioned the Maldives as a world leader 
on the topic of climate change and sea level rise, Gayoom noted that “the very survival of 
my island nation” was at stake. A larger excerpt from his speech is worth citing at length: 
 
We are trying to do what we can to combat this potential threat [global warming and sea-
level rise]. At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur 
in October 1989, the Maldives proposed that the Commonwealth make every effort 
possible to expedite the drafting of the framework convention on environment on which 
WMO and UNEP have been collaborating for some time. The initial report of the Inter-
Governmental Panel on Climate Change will be considered at the Second World Climate 
Conference to be held in Geneva from 29th of October to 7th of November this year, and 
it is hoped that the final convention be adopted at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development in 1992. 
 
A Small States Conference on Sea-Level Rise was hosted by the Maldives last year, and 
the Male' Declaration on Global Warming and Sea-Level Rise, which was adopted at the 
Conference, underscored the urgency of the problem and identified many areas of 
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possible international cooperation in this field. As called for in the Male' Declaration, an 
Action Group has been established to coordinate a joint approach on the issues of climate 
change, global warming and sea-level rise, and to pursue and follow up on global and 
regional response strategies. The Group comprising representatives from the 
Mediterranean, the Caribbean, the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions, is 
scheduled to meet in Male' early next year. 
 
There is however, a limit to what the small low-lying states can do. We need international 
help. In this multi-polar world where interdependency has become key element, we 
believe that it is not just the responsibility of the nations threatened by sea-level rise to 
take preventive measures. We remain convinced that it is also the duty of those states, 
whose race for development over many years had contributed to global warming, ozone 
depletion, acid rain and tropical deforestation, to reverse the existing situation. We cannot 
accept that economic development has to be achieved at the expense of our environment. 
 
The Maldives calls upon the industrialized nations to take urgent measures to reduce the 
emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and to adopt environmentally 
compatible technology. We urge them to assist the developing countries to implement 
similar measures. It is our earnest hope that the world community heed our voice - that of 
low-lying states - and save us from the ignominy of becoming environmental refugees. 
(Gayoom, 1990, Speech to UN General Assembly).   
 
Gayoom would go onto speak at a number of other venues in the wake of the 
1987 floods, and in so doing bring attention to the threat that global warming and sea 
level rise posed to his country and other low-level island nations.  Indeed, Gayoom was 
recognized by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for his leadership on the issue of 
climate change (Maldives Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008).   
Much of the current rhetoric surrounding climate change negotiations is 
encapsulated in above four paragraphs, written 20 years ago.  Indeed, Gayoom’s speech 
can be read as a template for the Maldives’ subsequent dealings with the international 
community on the topic of climate change and sea-level rise. In a nutshell: climate 
change is a survival issue for many people and those people are working quickly to 
remedy the problem in the arena of international relations; however, small states can only 
do so much and they are forced to call on large, wealthy states for help.  Ultimately, 
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Nasheed would make exactly the same argument. Nasheed would even repeat Gayoom’s 
claim that sea-level rise could conceivably make environmental refugees out of 
Maldivian residents. Indeed, Nasheed is perhaps most well-known internationally for his 
insistence that the Maldives be allowed to purchase territory to serve as a new homeland 
in the event that the island chain is submerged (Ramesh, Nov, 2008).  
The 1987 flooding that provoked Gayoom’s speech before the UN – which itself 
came to define the Maldivian position on climate change and sea-level rise – ironically 
had nothing at all to do with climate change. It was driven by tidal surges. This is part of 
a much more general phenomenon that I unearthed during my fieldwork. Indeed, in part 
what my research on the Maldives and the problem of sea-level rise discloses is a 
cognitive slippage between a realm of sea-related disasters broadly speaking and climate 
change induced sea level rise.  For example, during my research trip, I asked a number of 
key government officials and policymakers about the major events, which put sea level 
rise on the map for the Maldives. Apart from Nasheed’s election in 2008, most of my 
interviewees noted the importance of the 1987 storm surge as well as the earthquake-
driven 2005 tsunami as catalysts.   For example, Dr. Simad Saed, a member of President 
Nasheed’s advisory council on climate change in the Maldives, spoke to me about the 
changes that occurred after the flooding of Male’ in 1987: 
 
Yes I think, with the flooding events of Male’, it created real policy interest in the 
government, in all the departments of the government as to what might be the 
impacts and consequences.  President Gayoom did play an important role…in 
advocacy work, which led to the establishment of the commonwealth group.  An 
expert report was prepared (by the commonwealth group) and immediately there 
was a commonwealth meeting, a small island state meeting held in the Maldives 
on sea level rise which led to the establishment of the Alliance of Small Island 
States (AOSIS) which still negotiates in climate conferences (Interview with 
author, May, 2010).   
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 The impact of the flooding events in 1987 should not be understated, as it 
was a catalyst for the formation of AOSIS which now negotiates on behalf its 
members.  AOSIS has become a powerful geopolitical entity, whose formation 
largely relied on the fabrication of a sea level rise discourse reacting to a flooding 
phenomenon due to tidal surges and not climate change.  This was not a 
purposeful misleading but rather used as symbolic of what the future may hold, a 
harbinger of the future fate of the Maldives.  Even high-ranking officials of the 
Maldivian government when asked about the impact of non-climate change 
natural disasters on the climate change discourse do not make this distinction 
clear. 
Interviewer: …with former President Gayoom, he did some awareness raising 
about climate change issues, mostly motivated though by issues that actually 
aren’t related to climate change like flooding events and the tsunami and things 
like that. 
 
Interviewee: I think the Maldives has really positioned as you said before the 
center focal point and the vocal, the main vocal voice in climate change and 
adaptation and mitigation.  A major change is we’ve actually decided to move out 
of this victim introvert in that situation to go out and say look, you can’t do this to 
us.  So we’ve said it to China, we said it to the Americans; we’ve said it to the 
Europeans as well.  Look, you can’t keep doing this, and I think people are 
listening more than they had been before (Interview with author, April, 2010). 
 
 What is left unsaid in this portion of the interview is what exactly the 
Maldives would like China, America and Europe to stop doing.  The jump is 
made from raising awareness to geopolitical “position”.  Raising awareness is 
never innocent.  It never occurs in a black box.  Awareness raising is a 
geopolitical power play which allows a small island state on the periphery of the 
global economy to become central to the climate change debate.  The same 
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interview subject, a high-ranking official in the Maldives government said this on 
the Maldives geopolitical positioning, “I can guarantee that there won’t be any 
negotiation on climate change that will go without Maldives being included in it, 
and that’s been happening since President Nasheed has been elected” (Interview 
with author, April 2010).   
 The point that these officials forward is that climate change is more than 
just a politics of representation for them, it is being put into practice and has real, 
substantive impacts on the ground.  The tsunami in 2004 was another case of a 
non-climate change induced disaster catalyzing the discursive environment to the 
Maldives favor.  For example, the President has mentioned the possibility of 
buying land elsewhere to move to when the Maldives are washed away.  This 
language is always closely linked with the topic of environmental refugees which 
one interviewee cites explicitly in conjunction with the 2004 tsunami. 
I think it was very obvious to us during the tsunami, how vulnerable we are and 
how it is a security issue actually.  Because worse comes to worse, another 
tsunami hits, and if anything that happened to Sri Lanka happened to Maldives, I 
don’t think we would be sitting here today and we will have to leave.  We ill have 
to seek shelter.  We will have to go and mingle with other cultures…this is serious 
because it’s happening and we’re going to be environmental refugees, so even 
right now we’re experiencing, after the tsunami for example, that was a worst-
case scenario and we are seeing during the monsoon season more and more 
islands are getting flooded (Interview with author, April, 2010).   
 
 The Sumatran tsunami of 2004 has reverberating impacts much as the tidal-
surge flooding of 1987 has for the Maldives.  These cases have been 
demonstrative of the potential consequences of global climate change in the 
Maldives; however, they are cited again and again in the international discourse 
about climate change.  For example, in Copenhagen last winter, the Maldives was 
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featured in a photograph exhibit entitled “Climate Vulnerable”.  The pictures in 
the exhibit were meant to display how vulnerable countries like the Maldives is to 
global climate change.  Indeed, “It depicts a nation under threat, as it tries to 
safeguard an age-old culture and lifestyle that could be erased with rising seas and 
climate change.” (Bluepeacemaldives.com, About Vulnerable).  The most striking 
images in the set are off the ocean swelling over breakwaters; ironically, these 
pictures were taken during the tsunami of 2004 {see figure 4}.  This reiterates the 
points reflected in the interviews: this debate has largely been argued in discursive 
postures, the foundation for which is not rooted in climate change at all, but one 
time natural disaster events.  Geopolitical power is shifted by this discourse and 
substantive changes in the lives of local people are altered by the framing of these 
events as climate change related.   
The Maldives formed an alliance based on a perceived vulnerability awareness for 
which was catalyzed by a flooding event having nothing to do with the climate change 
from which they would be vulnerable.  Established shortly after President Gayoom’s 
“Death of a Nation” speech to the UN General Assembly, AOSIS serves to increase small 
island state solidarity and coalescence behind the issues that make them similar, such as 
their vulnerability to climate change.  The formation of AOSIS is in part due to the tidal 
surges of 1987, which motivated coalescence into a negotiating position.  
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) is a coalition of Small Island and low-lying 
coastal countries that share similar development challenges and concerns about the 
environment, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate 
change. It functions primarily as an ad hoc lobby and negotiating voice for Small Island 
developing States (SIDS) within the United Nations system. (AOSIS, About, 2009).   
 
Groups like AOSIS give geopolitical power to SIDS (Small Island Developing 
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States) as they coalesce in the geopolitical imagination around a particular issue or cause.  
While viewing a classic world map, countries like the Maldives, Tuvalu and Vanuatu 
may be difficult if not impossible to spot, often this is the case with geopolitical power 
relations as well.  However, while little land area can be claimed, SIDS in AOSIS still 
account for 20% of UN general membership (AOSIS, 2009).   
 AOSIS remains a powerful voting block in the UN and held special 
geopolitical power during the meetings at Copenhagen.  The Maldives has been the face 
of AOSIS ever since it’s creation and as AOSIS gains power, so does the Maldives.  The 
two main strictures AOSIS wanted included in any legally binding agreement coming out 
of the Copenhagen round of meetings in December 2009 were: 
1) Long-term stabilization of atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations at well below 350ppm CO2-equivalent levels and 
2) Global average surface temperature increases to be limited to well 
below 1.5° C above pre-industrial levels (AOSIS Declaration on Climate 
Change, 2009, Accessed from sidsnet.org on June 10, 2010). 
 
The Maldives has always been a key player in AOSIS, particularly in formulating 
the collective bargaining position of the group.  When asked about the bargaining 
position of the Maldives, only four months removed from the climate meetings in 
Copenhagen, one senior official said: “In no other time have the Maldives been listened 
to so well.  So we were pushing for 350 (ppm) and 1.5 (degrees Celsius)”  (Interview 
with author, April, 2010).  Interestingly enough, at least from the perspective of this 
government official, “The Europeans are willing to go for it (350 & 1.5) as long as it’s 
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mentioned in the IPCC Report” (Interview with Author, April, 2010).  As it currently, 
stands, the only number to make it into the non-legally binding Copenhagen accord is 2: 
two degrees of warming. 
To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention, to stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system, we shall, recognizing the scientific view that the 
increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius, on the basis of equity 
and in the context of sustainable development, enhance our long-term cooperative action 
to combat climate change. (UNFCCC, 2009, text of Copenhagen Accord) 
 
Punching above our weight 
 It seems intuitive that in international negotiations like the UNFCCC meetings in 
Copenhagen last winter that large countries, that is to say, nations with large economies 
and large populations wield the most power.  Indeed, countries with the largest 
economies have the most to lose by signing legally binding emissions reduction 
agreements, as they are the most heavily reliant on fossil fuels for energy that powers 
every economy.  Countries like the Maldives are extraordinarily peripheral in the global 
geopolitical imagination, yet they have shoved their way onto the stage, particularly in 
reference to climate change.  As several Maldivian officials told me, “We are punching 
above our weight.”  The main point is that the Maldives, through extremely small in 
terms of military power, economic power and classic geopolitical power has proven 
massive in the climate negotiations and the whole realm of climate geopolitics.  As 
summarized by International Media Advisor to the Maldives, Paul Roberts: 
I was speaking to a lot of people and asking them for their assessment on sort of how the 
Maldives did at Copenhagen and my contacts in the foreign policy world.  And they were 
saying that after America, China, India, EU, the next big country you’ll be talking about 
in terms of influences Copenhagen or who had a big presence there was the Maldives.  So 
again, with over 150 countries and the Maldives representing a population, which is a 
small town in the West.  I think that’s significantly punching above your weight 
(Interview with author, May, 2010).   
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Roberts makes an excellent point here.  It is clear that power is distributed most 
often times by the wealth of nations as well as by population of nations.  It appears at 
these international environmental conferences, those least willing to go along with legally 
binding agreements, that is to say, the “slowest ship”, wield power.  The slowest ships are 
the states with the most to lose i.e. largest carbon economies.  But the Maldives is 
punching above its weight by wielding a disproportionately high amount of power on the 
geopolitical stage.  Another official in the President’s office shared their thoughts on the 
subject: 
We are a very insignificant country, or we should be theoretically because we’re so small, 
it’s purely down to size.  Size and wealth as well.  And in order to really grab people’s 
attention, make them get our point…climate change of course, poses us with an 
existential central challenge in that if there isn’t a global solution then we go down.  So 
we have to do everything in our power to make sure that a global solution is found 
(Interview with author, April, 2010).   
 
The context of the above quote was the effectiveness and impact of the 
underwater cabinet meeting held by the Maldives highlighting their potential 
vulnerability to sea level rise.  This cabinet meeting was arranged in conjunction with the 
350.org movement.  According to sources in the Maldivian government, Bill McKibben, 
founder of 350.org approached President Mohamed Nasheed with the idea and the 
President ordered his cabinet members to become SCUBA certified for their hugely 
popular dive.  The news of the underwater cabinet meeting was published in hundreds of 
news outlets and, quite literally put the Maldives on the map in the geopolitics of climate 
change.  When asked about how the Maldives were punching above their weight, the 
Minister of Housing, Transport and Environment, Mohamed Aslam, had this to say: 
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On the issue of climate change, I don’t think there is anybody who is more appropriate to 
be at the very forefront of the negotiations than the Maldives.  The Maldives is naturally 
positioned for that.  We’re not playing international politics on nuclear arms, we’re not 
talking about border controls, we’re not talking about immigration.  We are talking about 
a real situation that we’re faced with and everybody has a very good understanding that 
the Maldives and states like us around the world are the frontline states in this.  So quite 
rightly, people do listen to us and I think it would be naïve for us not to realize that we 
have a morality and then we can play a major role in this.  Our country’s importance on a 
particular issue does not depend on its wealth; it depends on the importance of that 
country in relation to that particular issue…it is simply talking about climate change and 
we’re talking about saving ourselves and also trying to lead the world on a path that we 
think would be eventually lead to the saving ourselves also trying to lead the world on a 
path that we think would be eventually lead to the saving of human kind (Interview with 
author, April, 2010).   
 
For the Maldives, the reason that they are a key player on climate change is 
because in the debate on climate change, they, not major industrialized countries, have 
the most to lose.  Climate change poses a real existential threat to the Maldives as a 
sovereign nation, something only territorial war has produced in the past.  The Maldives 
has accomplished a remarkable position given their population, economy and general 
political clout.  They are indeed, ‘punching above their weight’ in the traditional 
geopolitical sense.  Other nations in similarly vulnerable environmental situations do not 
have the same authority that the Maldives do on this issue.   
Take, for example, Bangladesh: severely threatened by the specter of sea level 
rise resulting in the displacement of millions of people, the loss of enormous swaths of 
arable land and the prospect of fresh water shortages because of a lack of glacial supply 
(IPCC, 2007).  Climate change poses an existential threat to many Bangladeshi people, of 
which there are many.  In fact, Bangladesh is 533 larger than the Maldives in terms of 
population.  At Copenhagen, they barely showed up on the map. 
What makes the difference then on the world stage?  I have hopefully 
demonstrated that the Maldives certainly has some kind of geopolitical power on the 
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issue of climate change and disproportionately so if understood through traditional power 
metrics.  This evidence contradicts many theories of power and deserves investigation.  
The Maldives is punching above their weight and we will analyze how.   
First of all, the Maldives has a history with climate change, specifically with sea 
level rise, dating back to the late 1980’s and former president Maumoon Gayoom.  Since 
that time, the Maldives has been associated with climate change on the international stage 
and only increasingly since the election of President Nasheed in 2008.  Since 2008, three 
major events have pushed the Maldives to the front of the climate change scene.  Firstly, 
in November of 2008, newly elected President Nasheed told reporters of his intention to 
save up money to buy land for his country should they require relocation. Secondly, on 
March 15, 2009 President Nasheed announced his intention to turn the Maldives into the 
first carbon neutral nation.  Thirdly, on October 17, 2009 President Nasheed and his 
entire cabinet met to sign the 350.org accord underwater to highlight the nations 
vulnerability to sea level rise.  All of these gained considerable media attention leading 
up to the climate conference in Copenhagen.  In Copenhagen was an exhibit focusing on 
the vulnerability of the Maldives to climate change.  No event evidences the Maldives 
freshly gained political clout than their inclusion in the “secret summit”, the meeting 
during the last hours of the conference with only 25 heads of state.  It was at this meeting 
that the draft of the Copenhagen Accord was produced.  The Maldives was among elite 
company at this meeting. 
The Maldives has gained considerable notoriety as well as geopolitical power by 
leveraging the issue of climate change.  The Maldives has done an extraordinary job of 
‘selling’ itself as not only a climate vulnerable state but also a state that wants to be 
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proactive in solving the global climate crisis.  Because of this, other nations have taken 
notice and the Maldives is using this to try and tilt climate negotiations in their favor.  
While monetary motivations certainly do exist, the Maldives is in a unique position to 
call for cuts in global carbon emissions because for people who live there, not doing so 
means they will not be living in the Maldives by the end of the century barring major 
adaptation projects.  The Maldives has remapped the dominant scripts in geopolitics by 
highlighting their vulnerability effectively in international media, unlike other climate 
vulnerable states of the global South.      
 
 
Moral Authority 
One of the more important findings from my research concerns the problem of 
who is responsible for climate change and how Small Island Development States (SIDS) 
negotiate this responsibility on the international stage. Academic climate change 
literature, for example, makes the point that those who suffer the most from climate 
change-related environmental disaster are typically developing countries that are not 
significant contributors to climate change in the first place (Barnett, 2007 and S. Kasa et 
al, 2007). In an academic setting, where questions of justice and responsibility can be 
addressed in a political economic and legal vacuum, this literature makes the 
commonsensical point that those responsible for climate change should be held both 
legally and economically responsible for helping those communities most impacted by 
climate change. However, in practice the notion of responsibility for climate change is far 
stickier. Indeed, negotiations between those groups disproportionately responsible for 
climate change and others who disproportionately bear the brunt of climate change-
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induced environmental disaster are in general at an impasse. On the one hand this follows 
from developed countries’ unwillingness to legally as well as economically take 
responsibility for climate change – the costs would certainly be significant. On the other 
hand, it is difficult (if not impossible) to scientifically assign historical responsibility for 
climate change.  As a result, there is a ‘gridlock’ in international climate change 
negotiations over who is responsible and what is to be done about it (Roberts, 2001; 
Muller et al, 2007).   
For countries like the Maldives, gridlock in international negotiations over 
responsibility for climate change is unlike in other contexts. At stake is literally the 
country’s territory.  As noted by the President of the Maldives, “We can do nothing to 
stop climate change on our own and so we have to buy land elsewhere.  It’s an insurance 
policy for the worst possible outcome.  We do not want to leave the Maldives, but we 
also do not want to be climate refugees living in tents for decades” (Ramesh, 2008, 
Accessed January, 2010).  Indeed, if the IPCC’s most recent sea level rise projections are 
accurate, some concretized portions of the Maldives could be underwater within the next 
100 years.  This is why the Maldives has targeted climate change as their most important 
issue at the international scale: climate change poses a very real existential threat to the 
survival of the Maldives as a nation-state.  
In light of this urgency, my research shows how the Maldives is trying to 
negotiate the impasse noted above. In particular, my research shows that the Maldives’ 
strategy has shifted from one of alignment with the G77’s so-called “ecological debt” 
tactics to a quite different approach that I call “moral authority”. This is an important 
shift because it signals the limitations (and perhaps breakdown) of the G77 when it comes 
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to negotiating with the global north over climate change issues – no doubt one of the 
most important north-south issues on the global table. But the Maldives’ shift to a politics 
of “moral authority” is about more than the breakdown of perhaps the world’s most 
important venue for north-south dialogue. Indeed, the Maldives’ experiment in “moral 
authority” suggests a way around the general gridlock on climate change issues, noted 
above. Of course, whether or not the Maldives’ strategy will be successful, as well as 
whether or not it will be more widely adopted remains an open question. Nonetheless, it 
is a significant tactical response to the climate change gridlock in that it changes the 
terrain on which those communities most susceptible to climate change-induced 
environmental disaster engage with the global North.  
The Group of 77 was originally created as nations coalesced around the non-
aligned movement during the 1960’s and was intended to vocalize a common position for 
the Global South (S. Kasa et al, 2007).  The aim of the G77 is “to articulate and promote 
their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all 
major international economic issues within the United Nations system, and promote 
South-South cooperation for development” (G77, 2010).  While the stated aim and 
historical role of the G77 has been to aggregate the stances of its members into effective 
negotiating positions, often times the heterogeneity incumbent to the G77 means that 
certain stances may be mutually exclusive and even antagonistic (S. Kasa et al, 2007; 
Williams, 1997).  For example, represented by G77 are AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island 
States) as well as the OPEC countries (Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries).  Clearly, 
these two assemblages seek quite disparate ends when negotiating internationally, 
especially as it pertains to climate change and reduction of green house gases.  
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Unfortunately for AOSIS, the chair of the G77 has come from an OPEC nation the 
overwhelming majority of the time and OPEC wields considerably more power over the 
general direction of the group (Barnett, 2007; Yamin & Depledge, 2004; Barnett et al, 
2004).  Figure 5 describes the various economic contexts of the various G77 nations {see 
figure 5}.       
Additionally, the G77 still includes China and India in their numbers.  This is a 
sore spot in all international negotiations as both nations essentially hide under the 
blanket of the G77 when it suits their purposes but pursue independent bilateral 
agreements without the approval of the G77 when it suits their goals (S. Kasa et al, 
2007).  As we have shown, the goals of China, India and the larger industrialized nations 
in the G77 may be in direct competition with those of vulnerable states such as AOSIS, 
of which the Maldives are a member.   
The common position of SIDS is that of ecological debt: they have done the least 
to cause the problem of global climate change and yet are well positioned to suffer the 
first and worst consequences from it.  In some cases, these states may no longer be 
inhabited by their citizens because of the ecological damage suffered because of climate 
change (Report of the Global Conference on Sustainable Development of Small Island 
Developing States, 1994). 
Similar discourses have dominated the UNFCCC process effectively halving the 
world into two increasingly polarized groups: those who benefited from the burning of 
fossil fuels, and those who will suffer from the subsequent climate change.  But even in 
the G77, a group meant to aggregate the viewpoint of the nations of the global South, 
there are increasingly disparate viewpoints on the issue of climate change.  Some have 
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even suggested that in this power struggle, SIDS (Small Island Developing States) have 
already lost and must now prepare themselves for impending climate change adaptation 
rather than attempting to lead the world on the path of emissions mitigation (Gillespie, 
2003).  As my research shows, the Maldives is pursuing an altogether different plan of 
action, one requiring a divorce from the position of China, India, OPEC and the G77.     
What the Maldives has organized is in large part a campaign to draw attention to 
their existential fight against climate change.  However, the Maldives has differentiated 
themselves significantly from other SIDs and the G77 for reasons alluded to in one 
interview with a member of the President’s Advisory Council on climate change, a group 
that advises the President on international treaties. 
We are no longer going to say yes to any solution or accord or treaty or whatever just 
because we belong to a group.  We’re not going to do that, that’s why we broke away 
from G77 position and during Copenhagen because until last year, we have been saying 
yes we are going to go along with you, but no you don’t actually support our cause here.  
You are not helping us (Interview with author, April, 2010).   
 
In divorcing themselves from the G77 negotiating position the Maldives has 
ushered in a potentially cataclysmic sacrifice in geopolitical positioning, as historically 
the G77 has been a relatively powerful voting bloc and an avenue for small countries to 
table their issues with the international community.  However, the position of the G77 has 
been largely ineffective in generating any legally binding commitments from 
industrialized countries on emission reduction targets.  Because the G77 has adopted a 
position of demanding emission cuts from the industrialized world, but refuses to make 
any commitments to cut their own emissions, there has been an impasse at the recent 
rounds of climate negotiations such that it has caused the last two summits to 
disintegrate.  Few legally binding agreements have been established.   
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Enter Mark Lynas: author, correspondent for the Guardian newspaper and advisor 
to the President of the Maldives on climate change.  Lynas was hired to advise on the 
Maldives plan to become carbon neutral.  He is widely recognized as an expert, speaking 
about climate change and policy responses.  The ideas Lynas presents are 1) curbing 
emissions need not all be negative and self-sacrificing, it can be beneficial to the curbing 
country and 2) carbon neutral targets can unlock the impasse found in climate change 
negotiations (marklynas.com, About, Accessed April, 2010).   
His recent book, Six Degrees has been very popular with policy makers in the 
Maldives and his influence on the policy direction of the Maldives should not be 
underestimated.  According to one member of the President’s Office when I asked about 
Mr. Lynas’s role and influence, “Well, you’re right in that Mark Lynas’s book Six 
Degrees had a big impact on policy makers here…then all of a sudden we find ourselves 
with the good fortune of being able to work with him” (Interview with author, April, 
2010).  Lynas’ influence was corroborated in other interviews as well.  
 The carbon neutral plan was announced in March 2009 shortly after the election 
of President Nasheed.  Directly preceding Nasheed’s formal announcement of the 
Maldives intent to be carbon neutral by 2019 was a private screening of the film The Age 
of Stupid, a film that Lynas co-wrote, acted in and served as science advisor for.  This 
comes as no accident.  The effective message is acutely summarized by Paul Roberts, 
International Media Advisor to the President, “So it wasn’t a message that we’re very 
vulnerable, but it was also that we want to show the way out of this mess by de-
carbonizing the economy” (Interview with author, May, 2010).  The same attitude is 
reflected in several other interviews, the change from a negative to a positive discourse, 
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from one of problems to one of opportunities, from blaming others to taking the lead on 
the issue of climate change.  Again, International Media Advisor, Paul Roberts spoke on 
the branding effect of the carbon neutral pledge,    
The carbon neutral is a much more positive message.  I mean, that we may have to leave 
here is sort of an image of a country where the people are rolling up their trouser legs 
because the water is coming.  I think carbon neutral gives you a message – gives you an 
image of a country that’s rolling up its shirt sleeves because it wants to get stuff done.  So 
it’s a lot more positive (Interview with author, May, 2010).   
 
 Clearly, the main point of pursuing a carbon neutral target is to create soft power 
with which to swing climate negotiations in the favor of the committing nation.  Because 
the Maldives lacks ‘hard’ power (i.e. military, large economy), it also lacks the emissions 
incumbent to the creation of that power.  Perhaps one of the reasons for the impasse in 
climate change negotiations is that countries with the most power are also those with the 
most to lose because their power is predicated upon their emissions and thus curbing 
those emissions would necessarily curb their power.  While the implementation of the 
carbon neutral plan in the Maldives will certainly have tangible effects on the lived-
everyday in the Maldives, it serves a much greater purpose in the production of 
geopolitical power.  A member of the President’s Advisory Council on Climate Change 
detailed the importance of the carbon neutral plan as a motivational tool: 
Building seawalls, doing this and that, but then the real answer is that none of this is ever 
going to stop unless the outside world cares about this actually.  And the only 
way…we’ve come to a realization, and this is the reality.  This is the political reality as 
well.  Tree huggers are not going to stand it because people are not going to do it if 
they’re going to lose…the whole argument of environment needs to be changed from a 
list of negatives to a list of positives and that’s how economics works…so this has been 
sort of the President’s attitude, moving forward with things like the carbon neutral plan 
(Interview with author, April, 2010). 
 
 Once again, it is obvious that the consensus within the Maldives government is 
moving from the accusatory geopolitics of the G77 grounded in ecological debt theory, to 
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a position of leadership on the issue of climate change thus magnifying their position in 
the global geopolitical imagination.  Another member of the President’s office spoke 
about the carbon neutral plan and the geopolitical goals of the Maldives.  An extended 
portion of the interview is worth citing here at length. 
The former administration, even in the early 1980’s, started talking about this.  The 
former president, I think, his van, his convoy, was hit by tidal swells in – I think it was in 
1987, if I remember correctly.  So I mean, this was something that the Maldives have 
been talking about at international forums for many, many years, and that was the 
obvious approach you take – say look, we’re on the front line.  And if you don’t do 
anything we’re going down (Interview with author, April, 2010). 
 
What we see from statements like the one above is the point of distinction 
between the past and present strategies for motivating global change.  The past strategy 
was focused on negatives: “you are responsible”, “your fault”, etc.  While the facts of 
these matters (differentiating responsibility for climate change) are still under heated 
debate, the Maldives has chosen to move past this to a new future in which they assume a 
leadership role, which could potentially lead to first-mover benefits.  The frustration of 
government officials is obvious in the excerpt below, taken from an interview with a 
high-ranking Maldivian official.   
If you don’t have confidence in international agreements…you shouldn’t have to sail at 
the pace of the slowest ship.  Because there are all these benefits of moving first…and the 
potential to be game changing.  When you have the other countries trying to play catch-
up, you don’t want to be left out (Interview with author, May, 2010).  
 
 The Maldives is trying to move quickly and first.  They want to be the first 
carbon-neutral state by 2019.  But what possible benefit could this have?  After all, there 
is a reason no other country in the world is carbon neutral: money.  It costs a great deal of 
money to decarbonize an entire economy, particularly one run entirely on the energy 
production from imported oil and diesel fuels.  The Maldives lacks the internal funds to 
  51 
mitigate their own emissions.  But even if the Maldives had the requisite monies to 
decarbonize their economy, Paul Roberts highlights the meagerness of just one 
commitment to carbon neutrality: “The fact of the matter is the West stopped burning 
carbon tomorrow 100%, and the developing countries carried on the current trajectory, 
you would still be looking at a 4-6 degree rise in temperatures over the next 100 years or 
so” (Interview with author, May, 2010).  
 The carbon neutral pledge first moved towards reality when the Maldives signed 
an agreement with La Compagnie Benjamin de Rothschild as a ‘strategic partnership’ to 
help the Maldives execute the carbon neutral plan (Rothschild Group, 2010).  The carbon 
neutral plan includes three phases: first, performing a carbon audit of the Maldives to 
then generate a master plan of decarbonization in every sector of the economy and finally 
to secure investors who are willing to fund the necessary green technology projects to 
turn the Maldives carbon neutral.  A subsidiary of La Compagnie Benjamin de 
Rothschild, BeCitizen, will be performing the carbon audit and fabricating the carbon 
master plan, due out next year.  Minister of Investments for the Maldives, Mifzal Ahmed, 
spoke in an interview about how the Maldives provides an attractive investment 
destination because of its ‘green’ brand: 
The Maldives is a great case for investors to showcase their technology.  To showcase 
their commitment to the fight against climate change, so there is to some extent a 
willingness of the private sector to come in and do these initiatives in the Maldives…We 
are hoping that the positive energy created by our President around this, the energy, the 
image…there is significant public relations advantage to come and say well we have this 
in the Maldives.  You know we contributed to something very positive.  It might not 
mean that they make a hell of a lot of return on it, but most of the companies that I have 
met so far say: “Hey, as long as we don’t lose a chunk of money, we are willing to put 
something into.” 
… 
Sometimes you run into really strange investment motives, well not strange but take for 
example a mutual fund that operates out of Australia.  Australia’s got like the 4th or 5th 
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largest funds under management in the world.  Australian companies are very carbon 
heavy, you’ve got the big mining companies, Rio Tinto, all of these things.  There is a 
growing consciousness amongst investors; at least private investors that they want to 
clean up their portfolios.  So what do they do, well that portfolio can come and invest in 
an energy company based out of the Maldives, it might not provide them with a great 
return, but it provides them with that particular important green credential to their 
portfolio.  So I have been approached by large funds in Australia saying: “Give us a good 
product and we will look into it” (Interview with author, May, 2010).  
 
  The success of the carbon neutral plan depends entirely on currently non-existent 
commitments from investors.  While the Maldives want to become a showcase for clean 
energy technologies, they must do so by motivating private monies and investment.  
BeCitizen will sell their carbon neutral plan to investors with their novel idea of “Positive 
Economy” {see figure 6}.  Positive economy is an approach by which companies get a 
return on investment, which at the same time produces ‘natural capital’ (BeCitizen, 2010, 
www.becitizen.com).  The success of the carbon neutral plan in the Maldives largely 
hinges on how effectively they can sell the idea of positive economy and their ‘green 
brand’ to investors.   
 In actual fact, the Maldives contribution to global climate change is minute.  
While one can take into account air travel emissions for those coming on vacation to the 
Maldives, the amount of CO2 released related to the Maldives is truly negligible when 
viewed in a global context.  But this lack of emissions implies a vastly more important 
topic, that is who is changing the environment?  Who should be held accountable? 
 The Maldives argument is threefold: 1) they have done the least to cause climate 
change, 2) it will most negatively affect them and yet 3) they are doing the most to fix it.  
The third step, that is the carbon neutral plan, is the point of differentiation between the 
Maldives and many members of the global South. 
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The first two parts of the moral authority argument are common throughout 
climate change justice and ecological debt literatures as reviewed earlier.  The novel 
aspect that has been added by the Maldives is the idea of a carbon neutrality plan.  While 
the first two are articulated by many developing countries, the Maldives have attempted 
to differentiate themselves from the rest by assuming a leadership role on the topic and 
attempting to become carbon neutral.  Many of the subjects in my interviews mentioned 
the concept of moral authority as it related to the Maldives position on the geopolitical 
stage.  The following is excerpted from an interview with Dr. Simad Saed, a member in 
the President’s Advisory Council on Climate Change, the mandate for which is to advise 
the President on the negotiating position of the Maldives at international meetings.   
If Maldives is sinking because actions taken by a particularly developed country that is so 
adamant on not doing anything about it because it will somehow dent their economy, 
does the people of the Maldives just like, uh, if someone gets hit by a car while standing 
on the road, would the person who hit or the car that got hit, that was parked, have a right 
to ask for some form of compensation? These are questions that need to be asked.  If, I’m 
driving and if there’s a parked car and I hit one way of saying why, why should I pay for 
it, it just happened to be there. But is that the kind of moral language we use in other 
countries? We are taught in – from school that if you hit someone from your own action 
you better pay for it or you better do what is right, we are not asked to just ignore and 
then move on just because we had to pay money, yes, that’s exactly same with climate 
change. Others are progressing with their own economic agenda at speed, they do not 
even want to slow down, they do not want to even look at the site, to see what’s going on, 
and then if there is a nation by the side who gets hit, what happens (Interview with 
author, May, 2010)? 
 
 This segment highlights the need for recompense.  The Maldives will be forced to 
adapt to climate change with dollars and cents.  Because they are not responsible for the 
damage caused their homeland, they have pointed to other countries that, as Dr. Simad 
puts it, are “driving the car”.  This is representative of the ecological debt position and 
while the argument for moral authority is not evidenced in Dr. Simad’s comments he 
does hint at the moral questions that must be answered.  A member of the President’s 
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office described the logical thought process that was the impetus behind the argument 
from moral authority. 
 
Climate change, of course, poses us with an existent central challenge in that if there isn’t 
a global solution to this problem we go down.  So we have to do everything in our power 
to make sure that a global solution to this problem is found.  It was deemed that one 
really good way of doing this would be to take the moral high ground ourselves and say 
look, whether you’re coming with us or not, we’re going to go carbon neutral (Interview 
with author, April, 2010). 
 
 In this segment, further detail is revealed about the concept of moral authority or 
as stated above, “taking the moral high ground”.  Since much of the impasse at 
international climate negotiations is due to the G77 demanding cuts from industrialized 
countries that they are not willing to pursue themselves, the Maldives is attempting to 
short-circuit this argument by “walking the walk”.  Another member of the President’s 
Advisory Council on Climate Change articulated the moral authority argument in total 
during a conversation about the carbon neutral plan. 
We’re not guilty, we’re not guilty of polluting and environmental degradation but we’re 
still willing to take a step ahead and say look, here is a solution.  We are offering a 
solution why don’t you accept it and no one can come and point fingers at us and say, 
look you guys are major polluters you know, and why are you saying this.  But I think 
because we are the most vulnerable, one of the most vulnerable states, we have a right, 
we have a right to live, we don’t pollute and clearly we don’t have any agenda…so we 
don’t have any reason other than survival (Interview with author, April, 2010). 
 
With this evidence, it is clear that the Maldives intends for the carbon neutral 
target to not only to create for them soft power to use in these international negotiations, 
but also to provide a positive example to the rest of the world.  If you can pursue carbon 
neutrality in the Maldives: a nation currently 100% dependant on oil imports, with a 
budget foundering because of previous odious expenditures and little green infrastructure 
in place, you can do it anywhere.  So the Maldives have positioned themselves at the top 
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of the geopolitical-moral heap and rightly so as Paul Roberts summarizes: “It’s got moral 
authority because it’s done the least to cause a problem, it’s the most threatened but yet 
it’s still doing the most relatively to help fix things,” (Interview with author, May, 2010).  
Other interview evidence corroborates the three-part argument for moral authority.     
Climate change poses an existential security threat to the Maldives not only as a 
sovereign state but also as a nation of people.  People everywhere in the low-lying atoll 
will increasingly see their livelihoods, houses and well-being jeopardized by climate 
change.  The Maldives did not cause this to happen and must seek compensation or some 
form of redress to adapt to imminent climate change.  Instead of simply stating this at 
every turn, they have decided, on the advice of Mark Lynas, to move forward with a 
carbon neutral plan, believed to be the catalyst for the reaction that will break apart the 
logjam of non-action in these international negotiations.  While the carbon neutral plan 
will have a negligible impact on the Earth’s total carbon budget, it does serve a political 
purpose, furnishing the Maldives with the requisite moral authority to punch above their 
weight in international negotiations, like Copenhagen, and participate in the crafting of 
policies on which many other states remain mute.   
 
 
Conclusion 
In my thesis, I make four arguments: 
 Firstly, I have showed that the Maldives has forwarded a unique argument from 
moral authority on the issue of climate change.  Other states have not mobilized this 
argument before in the arena of global geopolitics.  The Maldives is able to deploy this 
argument because, while they are vulnerable to climate change like other states, they 
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have committed to 100% carbon dioxide emission reduction by 2019.  I have shown that 
this pledge was given not just to reduce the Maldives emissions, but more importantly to 
produce a previously nonexistent authority on the issue of climate change.  This is crucial 
in that it informs a broader understanding of how SIDS could procede in the future.  It 
remains to be seen if any other nations join the Maldives in their carbon neutral pledge.    
 Secondly, I argue that the Maldives meteoric rise to the forefront of the issue of 
global climate change is no accident.  Indeed, the Maldives has stated their intention to 
become a key player on climate change globally (Maldives SAP, 2009, pp. 392).  They 
have accomplished this goal with smart brand management and genius acts of political 
theatre (i.e. underwater cabinet meeting).  This narrative of climate change in the 
Maldives has been produced by myriad actors and sometimes through events completely 
unrelated to climate change.  I argue that while many inside and outside of the Maldives 
perceive them as to be ‘punching above their weight’ in global politics, this merely belies 
the common geopolitical imagination of power, that is by population and economic clout.  
I argue that the Maldives being at the forefront of the global climate change debate 
represents a shift in how power is produced and perceived in the global geopolitical 
imagination.  My research shows that elites in the Maldivian state believe they should 
rightly hold the authority on this issue and thus be at the center of dictating global climate 
policy.   
 Thirdly, I have shown from secondary research that non-concretized Maldivian 
atolls could be resilient to projected sea level rise, persisting through even rapid changes 
in sea level.  While this may be true, I argue that this point is academic only, as nearly all 
Maldivians inhabit islands that are concretized to some extent.  Further research is 
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required to fully understand how the natural resilience of coral atolls can aid in adaptation 
projects.  This could potentially eliminate the need for hard engineering solutions, 
substantially lowering the cost of adaptation.   
 Finally, I have attempted to answer the question of “how dominant scripts of 
geopolitics can be both displaced and re-situated in order to foreground the security of 
people on the ground, those subjects effaced by realist geopolitics and international 
relations” (Hyndman, 2004, pp.311).  To this end, I have shown that the Maldives is re-
situating the dominant scripts of geopolitics by mobilizing a novel argument, replacing 
traditional power discourses of population and economy with a discourse of existential 
human rights and “a country rolling up its shirt sleeves because it wants to get stuff done” 
(Interview with author, May 2010).    
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 Aerial Photograph of Male’, Maldives.  (Google Earth, Accessed August 2010) 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Figure 4    
 
 
 
 
 Photograph of 2004 tsunami in Male’, Maldives.  Photo permission: Firas Afeef. 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Figure 5 
 
 
  Table describing the heterogeneity within the G77 with regards to emissions and economic status.  (S. Kasa et al, 2008, pp. 117) 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Figure 6  
 
 
 
 BeCitizen’s explanation of their unique “Positive Economy” approach.  (BeCitizen, Copyright 2009, http://www.becitizen.com/vision_econ_1.php?lang=en&currentid=19) 
 
